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The neural correlates of rapid eye movements (REMs) in sleep are extraordinarily robust;
including REM-locked multisensory-motor integration and accompanying activation
in the retrosplenial cortex, the supplementary eye field and areas encompassing
cholinergic basal nucleus (Hong et al., 2009). The phenomenology of REMs speaks
to the notion that perceptual experience in both sleep and wakefulness is a constructive
process – in which we generate predictions of sensory inputs and then test those
predictions through actively sampling the sensorium with eye movements. On this view,
REMs during sleep may index an internalized active sampling or ‘scanning’ of self-
generated visual constructs that are released from the constraints of visual input. If this
view is correct, it renders REMs an ideal probe to study consciousness as “an exclusively
internal affair” (Metzinger, 2009). In other words, REMs offer a probe of active inference –
in the sense of predictive coding – when the brain is isolated from the sensorium
in virtue of the natural blockade of sensory afferents during REM sleep. Crucially,
REMs are temporally precise events that enable powerful inferences based on time
series analyses. As a natural, task-free probe, (REMs) could be used in non-compliant
subjects, including infants and animals. In short, REMs constitute a promising probe
to study the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of consciousness and perhaps
the psychopathology of schizophrenia and autism, which have been considered in terms
of aberrant predictive coding.
Keywords: predictive coding, dream, rapid eye movements (REMs) in sleep, autism, visual perception,
retrosplenial cortex, claustrum, thalamic reticular nucleus
INTRODUCTION
Consciousness has long been considered as the brain’s passive response to sensory stimuli from
the external world. However, empirical evidence suggests that consciousness is actively generated
within the brain: sensory signals from the outside world merely constrain the internal generation
of consciousness in wakefulness. Furthermore, in dreaming, the brain generates consciousness
Abbreviations: EOG, electroculogram; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging; MTL, medial temporal lobe; PET,
positron emission tomography; PGO, pontine-geniculate-occipital; REMs, rapid eye movements (not REM sleep); RSC,
retrosplenial cortex.
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without external sensory stimuli. Interestingly, von Helmholtz
arrived at the insight in the 19th century: consciousness is an
internal and constructive process (von Helmholtz, 1924).
Depicting perception as a process of probabilistic, knowledge-
driven inference— as in predictive coding theory — follows
Helmholtz’s formulation of perception as inference (1860)
(Hobson and Friston, 2012; Clark, 2013; Friston et al., 2014;
Hobson et al., 2014). The brain infers (i.e., perceives) the causes
of sensations (i.e., the outside world), despite the fact that the
brain has no direct access to their source (Clark, 2013). The brain
is inferentially secluded from the world and is essentially self-
evidencing (Hohwy, 2016). In other words, the brain infers the
causes of sensory input hidden beyond the evidentiary boundary
afforded by our sensory epithelia (Hohwy, 2016): conscious
experience is “an exclusively internal affair” (Metzinger, 2009).
For example, nearly 95% of input to the lateral geniculate nucleus
is non-retinal (Guillery and Sherman, 2002). According to Llinás
and Paré (1991) the brain is essentially a “closed system,” awake or
dreaming, which is perturbed and modulated by sensory stimuli.
Other theoretical accounts, such as the integrated information
theory of consciousness (Tononi et al., 2016), also consider the
brain as a closed system and consciousness as an internal affair.
This renders REM sleep an ideal state for studying internal brain
mechanisms – in isolation from the sensorium – because much
of the external sensory input to the brain is blocked in REM sleep
(Funk et al., 2016); albeit incompletely (Deiber et al., 1989; Issa
and Wang, 2008; Blume et al., 2018). Compared to tonic REM
sleep, the sensory blockade is greater during phasic REM sleep,
which is characterized by bursts of REMs (Wehrle et al., 2007;
Ermis et al., 2010; Windt, 2017). In studies of visual perception
in wakefulness, irrelevant non-visual stimuli may confound the
interpretation of empirical findings – but this cannot be the case
in REM sleep (Hong and Harris, 2009).
Our generative models (explained in section “Hierarchical
Predictive Processing — How Does the Brain Infer the World?”
as models we use to make sense of our sensorium) pertain not
only to the external milieu, but also the bodily-self, as evidenced
by recent studies of introception (Blanke, 2012; Ehrsson, 2012)
and illucidated by philosophical arguments (Metzinger, 2007).
The world-model, with the self-model at its center both in
wakefulness (Metzinger, 2007) and dreaming (Staunton, 2001;
Hobson et al., 2014; Windt, 2017), can be viewed as an
inference architecture, enabling adaptive interaction of the self
with the world in simulation (Metzinger, 2009; Windt, 2017).
Crucially, multisensory-motor integration time-locked to REMs
in sleep (Hong et al., 2009), supports this scientific (Blanke,
2012; Ehrsson, 2012; Hobson et al., 2014) and philosophical
(Metzinger, 2007, 2009; Windt, 2017) insight. In short, rapid eye
movements (REMs) in sleep may index a fictive (i.e., imaginal
or counterfactual) engagement with the world prescribed by a
generative model; much like simulations in a virtual world.
There is clear evidence that dreaming and waking perception
share the same neural substrates and mechanisms (Hong et al.,
1995, 2009; Horikawa et al., 2013; Andrillon et al., 2015). Indeed,
Hobson proposed the ‘protoconsciousness theory,’ in which REM
sleep has a foundational role in developing and maintaining
waking consciousness (Hobson, 2009). Extrapolation from
observations of premature newborns (Roffwarg et al., 1966)
suggests a marked preponderance of REM sleep in the last
trimester of pregnancy (Hobson, 2009) (Figure 1). Indeed,
ultrasound imaging – that enables visualization of fetal eye
movements – suggest that REM sleep commences in utero as early
as 23 weeks and constitutes the majority of fetal life into the third
trimester of pregnancy (Birnholz, 1981).
Our studies in this area (Hong et al., 2009) have focused on the
neural correlates of REMs per se, as opposed to phasic REM sleep.
FIGURE 1 | Ontogenesis of REM Sleep. Human sleep and age. The marked preponderance of REM sleep in the last trimester of pregnancy — and the 1st year of
life — decreases progressively as waking time increases. Note that non-REM sleep time, like waking time, increases after birth. Despite its early decline, REM sleep
continues to occupy approximately 1.5 h per day throughout life. This suggests its strongest developmental contribution is to early brain-mind development;
however, it subsequently plays an equally indispensable part in brain-mind maintenance. The ‘after-birth’ part of this figure assimilates findings from several groups
(Roffwarg et al., 1966), while the ‘before-birth’ recapitulates Hobson’s extrapolation from a small number of observations of premature newborns (Roffwarg et al.,
1966). Adapted from (Hobson, 2009) with the permission from Springer Nature.
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Our findings suggest that REM-locked brain activity is distinct
from baseline brain activity during phasic REM sleep. Clearly,
REM-locked brain activity changes overlap with those associated
with REM sleep (particularly, phasic REM sleep, which entails
most REMs); however, our findings indicate that the overlap may
reflect spillover effects accompanying REMs. In particular, brain
activity changes time-locked to video-timed REMs speak to the
utility of characterizing temporally precise REMs, as opposed to
comparing the neural correlates of phasic vs. tonic REM sleep.
Event-related fMRI (characterizing REMs in sleep based
on direct visual inspection — as opposed to indirectly by
electrooculography) is well placed to capture the neural correlates
of consciousness. In this paper, we review how REMs could be
considered as indexing the active sampling of a fictive world
generated by our internal models (Hong et al., 2009; Hobson
et al., 2014). Our fMRI findings provide empirical support
for predictive coding, protoconsciousness theory, and related
treatments of conscious experience (Hobson et al., 2014). We will
review these theoretical constructs and new findings (Andrillon
et al., 2015; Auger et al., 2015; Darby et al., 2017) to show
how REM-locked sensorimotor integration can reveal some of
the fundamental processes that underwrite our experience of
the world. In short, we suggest that REMs in dreaming sleep
constitute a powerful probe into consciousness — and its normal
and abnormal development. To motivate the study of the neural
correlates of REMs, we provide a brief introduction to predictive
coding theory. We then explain why REMs may offer a unique,
promising new probe into consciousness.
CONSCIOUSNESS AS INFERENCE
How Have Helmholtz’s Insights Been
Pursued?
There are two aspects of Helmholtz’s work (von Helmholtz,
1882, 1924), on which neuroscientists have built their theories:
perception as inference and the notion of efference copy (von
Helmholtz, 1924) (see Box 1). The notion of efference copy
was subsequently developed by Sperry (1950), von Holst and
Mittelstaedt (1950), Hobson and McCarley (1977), Guillery
and Sherman (2002), and Koenderink (2015). In particular,
the notions of unconscious inference (von Helmholtz, 1882)
and efference copy have been used as the basis of a ‘Bayesian
brain’ formulation of sentient or active inference (Friston
et al., 2006; Friston, 2009, 2010). In this formulation, the
brain infers the causes of its sensations by constructing
explanations that minimize surprise (aka prediction error).
In this setting, efference copy corresponds to the brain’s
predictions of sensory consequences of action. The Bayesian
brain is one facet of active inference (Friston, 2009) and the
most popular process theory for neuronal implementation of
Bayesian inference is predictive coding (Friston et al., 2013).
Predictive coding then offers a formal explanation for how the
brain makes inferences about the world and, crucially, how
false inference can be used to understand psychopathology
in conditions like autism (Pellicano and Burr, 2012; Friston
et al., 2013, 2014; Gómez et al., 2014; Lawson et al., 2014;
Quattrocki and Friston, 2014; Skewes et al., 2014; Van de
Cruys et al., 2014) and schizophrenia (Dima et al., 2009;
Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Brown et al., 2013; Friston et al.,
2014).
Hobson and McCarley pursued Helmholtz’s suggestion that
efference copies of motor commands are sent to the sensory
processing areas to predict the sensory effects of movement,
in both waking and dreaming (von Helmholtz, 1924). Indeed,
firings of burst neurons in the brainstem consistently precede
ipsiversive REMs and ponto-geniculo-occipital (PGO) waves.
This suggests that PGO waves convey the direction of eye
movements (efference copy or corollary discharge) to visual
sensory systems (Nelson et al., 1983). In short, Hobson and
McCarley (1977) proposed that the cyclically activated forebrain
synthesizes dreams from internally generated information.
BOX 1 | Corollary discharge
A copy of motor commands is sent to sensory processing regions of the
brain. Corollary discharge is crucial for the control of subsequent movements
(particularly for rapid sequential movements, like saccades in waking or REMs
in sleep) and for the interpretation of subsequent sensory information. Without
the suppression of visual motion cues during movements (a.k.a. saccadic
suppression) through corollary discharge, REMs would confound vision. This
is an important example of sensory attenuation.
Efference copy
An internal copy of an efferent motor command: von Helmholtz, a German
physician and physicist, first proposed the notion of efference copy to explain
why passive movement of the eyeball – on pressing it – causes a percept that
the world moves. In contrast, volitional movements of the eyeball – caused by
motor commands – ensure that we perceive the world as remaining still.
Efference copies may therefore play a key role in saccadic suppression, or
sensory attenuation, and may also explain why we cannot tickle ourselves.
Under predictive coding formulations, efference copy is equivalent to corollary
discharge, mediating top-down predictions and sensory attenuation.
Do We Perceive the World as It Is?
According to Metzinger nature’s virtual reality world-model
can be viewed as “online simulation” (Metzinger, 2009).
“Millions of years ago, nature’s [own neural] virtual reality
[machine] achieved what today’s software engineers still strive
for: the phenomenal properties of presence and full immersion”
(Metzinger, 2009). These properties convince us that what
we perceive in wakefulness is the world itself (dubbed as
‘naïve realism’). But what we perceive is a model of the
world generated by the brain. The brain is both a hierarchical
and parallelized system that is able to infer the world; it
can source the causes of limited data that are sampled
by our sensory organs (Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013). The
experience of color is a compelling example, demonstrating
that the real world ’out there’ can be differentiated from
what we perceive – and also demonstrating the limits of
our perceptual capacity. Our brain can process only a tiny
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum ‘out there’ that
includes gamma ray, X-ray, ultraviolet, ‘visual spectrum,’
infrared, microwave, and radio wave frequencies. The color
we perceive is not “out there” in the real world. “It is a
property of the internal model . . . created by your brain”
(Metzinger, 2009). The only things out there are the reflectance
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properties of objects and electromagnetic waves of varying
wavelengths. The real world is colorless, but the brain paints
the internal model with colors to encode differences in
wavelengths of the ‘visual spectrum’ (400–700 nm) (Metzinger,
2009).
One caveat is needed in using the popular term ‘virtual
reality.’ We use this expression to underline the fact that what
we consciously experience to be the world is not the world itself,
but the content of a model of the world generated from within;
we do not mean that the world we live in is virtual, not real, or
that there is no underlying physical reality behind our perception
(Metzinger, 2009).
A Virtual Body at the Center of a Virtual
Reality in Wakefulness
If the world we perceive is a virtual reality, what about the
body that we perceive to be our own? Interestingly, the rubber-
hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) and experimentally
induced out-of-body experiences (Ehrsson, 2007) indicate that
what we perceive as the bodily self in wakefulness is also a
construct of the brain (Metzinger, 2007; Blanke, 2012; Ehrsson,
2012) (Figures 2A,B). Furthermore, these experiments suggest
that multimodal sensory integration is essential for generating a
model of the bodily self (Metzinger, 2007; Blanke, 2012; Ehrsson,
2012). Viewing a rubber hand being stroked with a paintbrush,
while feeling (synchronous but unseen) touch sensations from
the corresponding part of the real hand generates the illusion that
the touch sensations emanate from the rubber hand (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998) – and even induces experience of illusory
ownership of the fake hand (Metzinger, 2007; Blanke, 2012;
Ehrsson, 2012). Indeed, seeing the fake hand being injured
causes people to flinch with attendant and marked physiological
responses (Metzinger, 2007; Ehrsson, 2012). A whole body
version of the classic rubber hand illusion employs a mannequin
and a head-mounted display to provide synchronous visual and
tactile stimuli (Metzinger, 2007; Petkova et al., 2011; Ehrsson,
2012) (Figure 2C).
Crucially, at least 20% of persons born without limbs
(phocomelia) experience phantom limbs, indicating that the
bodily self-model can be innately generated by neural networks,
without sensory input from the limbs (Melzack et al., 1997;
Metzinger, 2003). The bodily self-model — being in part
genetically determined — likely serves this fundamental function
(Melzack et al., 1997; Metzinger, 2003). We will return to this
later. The world-model, with the self-model at its center, can
be viewed as a highly “advanced, user-friendly interface design,”
and “a wonderfully efficient control device,” “like a total flight
simulator” (but whose “virtuality is hidden”) in which our
bodily self manipulates the virtual environment in wakefulness
(Metzinger, 2009), and, of course, in dreaming.
REM-Locked Generation of a Virtual
Body
The key contribution of REM-based fMRI studies is evidence for
multisensory integration time-locked to REMs in dreaming sleep
(Hong et al., 2009). Multimodal sensory integration is essential
for generating a bodily self-model (Metzinger, 2007; Blanke,
2012; Ehrsson, 2012). Thus, REMs may be associated with the
generation of (bodily somatosensory) self-images in dreaming
(Hobson et al., 2014). Interestingly, the brain regions implicated
in construction of a bodily self-model in wakefulness (Blanke,
2012) are also found to be activated in a time-locked manner
to REMs in sleep; namely, primary somatosensory cortex,
premotor cortex, vestibular cortex, insula, anterior cingulate
cortex, putamen, and superior temporal gyrus (Hong et al., 2009).
REM-locked multisensory integration seems to be an integral
part of generating both a virtual reality and a virtual body in
dreaming.
The similarities between waking and dreaming consciousness
go beyond perception of the surrounding world or bodily self, and
extend to interactions between them. Dreams are almost always
from the first-person perspective (Staunton, 2001; Hobson et al.,
2014) and the self is in the perceived center in dreaming, not
only as an observer (Staunton, 2001), but also as an agent, a
virtual body that navigates a virtual reality in dreaming (Hobson
et al., 2014). The virtual body is embodied at the center of virtual
reality, as an agent, both in wakefulness (Metzinger, 2007) and in
dreaming. Hobson (2009, 2017) proposed that this body-world
interaction is simulated in REM sleep, which is copious in utero,
to promote the survival of our physical body in the physical world
after birth.
Hierarchical Predictive Processing —
How Does the Brain Infer the World?
Perception entails inference or modeling (Hobson et al., 2014).
Modern-day versions of Helmholtz’s formulation of perception
consider the brain as a ‘Bayesian inference’ machine (Friston,
2010; Clark, 2013). Bayesian inference is a method of statistical
inference, in which the prior probability for a hypothesis (often
simply called a ‘prior’) is updated as data become available. The
brain has prior beliefs (hypotheses or predictions) about states of
the world ‘out there,’ before sampling their sensory consequences.
For example, the brain has prior knowledge that faces are convex
and — in the hollow mask illusion — this prior is typically
strong enough to override veridical sensory signals generated by
a concave facial mask. Predictive coding theory explains how the
brain perceives the world, i.e., how the brain infers the world
hidden in sensory data (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2010;
Friston et al., 2012, 2014; Clark, 2013). This theory provides a
computational or formal explanation for how the brain generates
its model of the world; i.e., how we “infer the nature of the
signal source (the world) from just the varying input signal itself ”
(Clark, 2013). A ‘generative model’ is a probabilistic model used
in statistics and in machine learning to estimate the hidden
causes underlying observed phenomena. It is usually specified
in terms of a prior belief about the causes and the likelihood
of observations, given the causes (Friston, 2010; Hobson and
Friston, 2014). On this view, perceptual synthesis corresponds
to selecting hypotheses that explain sensations (Gregory, 1980).
In brief, the brain generates a hypothesis about the causes of
sensory data (i.e., ‘prediction’ in predictive coding) and then tests
the hypothesis by comparing it with sampled sensory data to
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FIGURE 2 | Rubber hand illusion, out-of-body illusion and mannequin illusion. (A) Experimental setups used in the rubber hand illusion. For details, see the text. In
(B,C) the participants wear a set of head-mounted displays connected to two video cameras placed on a tripod 1.5 m behind the participants in (B) or on the
mannequin’s head in (C). The images from the left video camera are presented on the left eye display and the images from the right camera on the right display. In
(B) the participants see themselves from the point of view of the cameras, that is, from behind. In (C) the cameras are positioned so that the participants are looking
down on the mannequin’s body with stereoscopic vision. Adapted from Ehrsson (2012) with permission from the MIT Press.
check for any discrepancy (i.e., ‘prediction error’ in predictive
coding).
It is generally thought that the brain embodies a hierarchical
generative model (Friston et al., 2012; Hobson and Friston, 2012;
Hobson and Friston, 2014; Hobson et al., 2014). In predictive
coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013),
the brain infers the cause of sensory signals (ultimately, the
world) by updating its internal model of the world through a
multilevel cascade of processing that involves recurrent message
passing between higher and lower levels of the cortical hierarchy
(Figure 3). “In hierarchical models, the output of one level acts
as an input to the next” (Friston et al., 2012). Our brains have a
hierarchically deep structure, which enables the brain to acquire
models of increasing hierarchical depth, progressively higher
or deeper levels of representational abstraction or explanation
(Hobson et al., 2014). The higher in the hierarchy, the more
integrated and abstract – and the further removed from sensory
data the empirical priors become. This is in line with the
following description of “mathematical elegance” reflected in the
structure of the natural world (Davies, 1992): “The essence of
Life’s complexity lies not with the rules, but with their repeated
use. The computer has to work hard applying the rule again
and again, before it can generate deeply complex patterns from
simple initial rules. . . The study of computation has enabled
us to recognize that the world is ordered both in the sense of
being algorithmically compressible, and in the sense of having
depth.”
Efficient statistical inference is evident in the retina, at the
initial stages of sensory information processing by the brain
(Hosoya et al., 2005). Predictive coding equips the brain with an
efficient perceptual tool to generate a model of the world hidden
behind sensory data. Clearly, our brain has to explain the world
outside quickly and efficiently; otherwise, we could not survive
in a capricious and changeable world. Predictive coding theory
explains how the brain accomplishes this — and what might
happen if inference goes awry. We will return to this in Section
“Active Inference and Protoconsciousness Hypothesis.”
Predictive Coding Theory May Explain
Self-Modeling
If predictive coding theory explains how the brain infers
and generates models of the world, why not models of the
bodily self? (Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013). In brief,
active inference and predictive coding have the potential to
explain how the brain infers and generates its model of bodily
self from visual, tactile, proprioceptive and vestibular sensory
data; that is, “by predictive multisensory integration of self-
related signals (Seth, 2013).” On this view, one might expect
that predictive coding can also explain what happens when
this predictive integration fails. That is, the distorted, often
delusional, perception of bodily self in anorexia nervosa and
body dysmorphic disorder may be caused by defective bodily-
self-modeling, due to aberrant predictive coding. A review
of the literature on visual processing in anorexia nervosa
and body dysmorphic disorder suggests over-attention to
detail and reduced processing of global features – both in
anorexia nervosa and body dysmorphic disorder (Madsen
et al., 2013). Studies of non-visual (tactile, proprioceptive
and interoceptive) sensory processing in anorexia nervosa
also show a similar impairment (Gaudio et al., 2014). For
example, individuals with anorexia nervosa overestimate the
size of tactile distances, and this false inference correlates
with psychopathology (Keizer et al., 2011). Anorexia nervosa
patients experience the rubber hand illusion more acutely than
controls, which also correlates with psychopathology (Eshkevari
et al., 2012). Interestingly, according to the predictive coding
theory, aberrant inference about the (exteroceptive) world and
the (interoceptive) bodily self offers a plausible explanation
for autistic or schizophrenic experience (as expounded later
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FIGURE 3 | Schematic representation of the neuronal architecture that might encode conditional expectations about the states of a hierarchical model. This shows
the speculative cells of origin of forward driving connections that convey prediction error from a lower area to a higher area and the backward connections that
construct predictions. These predictions try to explain away prediction error in lower levels. In this scheme, the sources of forward and backward connections are
superficial and deep pyramidal cells, respectively. The equations represent a gradient descent on free-energy under the hierarchical models described in Friston et al.
(2012). State units are in black and error units in red. Here, neuronal populations are deployed hierarchically within three cortical areas (or macro-columns). Within
each area, the cells are shown in relation to cortical layers: supra-granular (I–III) granular (IV) and infra-granular (V–VI) layers. For simplicity, conditional expectations
about control states had been absorbed into conditional expectations about hidden causes. Adapted from Friston et al. (2012) with permission from Friston.
in section “Predictive Coding Accounts of Severe Mental
Disorders”).
Aberrant Self-Modeling
Patients with Cotard delusion deny existence of the self (and
frequently even the world) (Berrios and Luque, 1995a; Metzinger,
2003/2004). The most common theme of Cotard delusion
involves bodily self (Berrios and Luque, 1995b). The Cotard
delusion suggests that what we consciously experience to be
ourselves is also the content of a model generated by our
brain (Metzinger, 2003/2004). Self-modeling may go awry, just
as aberrant world-modeling may be manifest in schizophrenia.
Delusional misidentification of other persons (Capgras delusion)
and places (reduplicative paramnesia) is related to delusions
about self (Cotard delusion) (Förstl et al., 1991). Capgras delusion
is the belief that a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an
identical-looking impostor. Reduplicative paramnesia involves
the delusional belief that a place or location has been duplicated.
Delusional misidentification (delusion of doubles) of pets and
inanimate objects was also reported (Berson, 1983; Anderson
and Williams, 1994; Wright et al., 1994; Ellis et al., 1996; Darby
and Caplan, 2016). Prosopagnosia consists in the inability to
recognize familiar faces (Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006; Corrow
et al., 2016), “including, in some cases, one’s own face reflected in
a mirror” — personal identity as visually given disappears from
conscious experience (Metzinger, 2003).
These delusions and prosopagnosia are rare but coexist in
some cases, and are commonly associated with brain diseases
(Berson, 1983; Anderson, 1988; Förstl et al., 1991; Anderson and
Williams, 1994; Weinstein, 1994; Wright et al., 1994; Ellis and
Lewis, 2001; Debruyne et al., 2009). This indicates a shared neural
infrastructure that constitutes the generative model of self and
world – including other persons, pets, objects and places (and
underlies familiarity perception) (Darby et al., 2017). Indeed, a
recent study (Darby et al., 2017) identified such an overlap in
the left RSC; namely, they showed that the left RSC was the
region most likely to be activated by personally familiar (versus
unfamiliar) sensory (visual and auditory) stimuli (persons, places,
and objects) (Darby et al., 2017).
Retrosplenial Cortex
The RSC contributes to autobiographical, episodic memory as
well as spatial memory and navigation (Maguire, 2001; Harker
and Whishaw, 2004; Vann et al., 2009). Autobiographical memo
comprises episodes of self in a place (i.e., backdrop) and
thus involves spatial processing. The RSC codes specifically
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for permanence of location among different attributes of
various outdoor items (Auger et al., 2015), and this coding
for permanence may be a prerequisite for successful navigation
(Auger et al., 2012; Auger and Maguire, 2013) and for scene
processing and autobiographical memory (Auger et al., 2015).
Problems with permanence coding by RSC may explain spatial
disorientation and episodic memory impairment — the early
signs of Alzheimer’s disease (Auger et al., 2012, 2015; Auger and
Maguire, 2013). Interestingly, RSC hypometabolism (Minoshima
et al., 1997; Nestor et al., 2003) and atrophy (Pengas et al., 2010)
have been found at its earliest stages (Vann et al., 2009 for review).
Neural Correlates of Self-Modeling, Familiarity
Perception and Spatial Navigation
Both delusional misidentification syndrome and familiarity
perception were found to be linked to the left RSC (Darby
et al., 2017) and there are apparent connections between the
two. Capgras delusion targets “those people to whom the
patient was tied with intense affective sentiment” (Capgras et al.,
1924), mostly parents and spouses (Berson, 1983). All delusional
misidentification concerns personally familiar objects. It has been
suggested that both Capgras delusion and prosopagnosia result
from disturbance of integrating or imbuing visual perception
with affective familiarity (Anderson, 1988). A person with Cotard
delusion finds it “impossible to consciously experience familiarity
with himself ” (lose “self-intimacy”); “the physical body is not
owned anymore” (Metzinger, 2003/2004). Familiarity or intimacy
with self is crucial for adaptive interaction of the self with the
world and self-preservation in the world (Metzinger, 2003/2004).
In summary, RSC activity is correlated both with permanence
coding (positively) and with familiarity perception (and aberrant
bodily-self-modeling) (negatively, with left RSC). The bodily self-
model is “the spatial model of the self ” (Metzinger, 2003). We
propose that RSC plays a crucial role in the aforementioned
innate generation of the spatial bodily self-model (Melzack et al.,
1997; Metzinger, 2003). This proposal is supported by RSC’s
role in spatial permanence coding (Auger et al., 2012, 2015;
Auger and Maguire, 2013), the permanently central location of
the bodily self-model (except in out-of-body experience), RSC’s
involvement in Cotard’s syndrome (Darby et al., 2017), and
the early neurodevelopmental establishment of RSC in neural
circuits. For example, the default mode network (DMN) can
be seen in children of ages 2 weeks to 2 years; where the RSC
is the main hub of the emerging DMN (Gao et al., 2009).
Neurobiological findings further suggest that the RSC is a key
structure in normal and abnormal self-modeling, familiarity
perception and spatial navigation (permanence coding). In
short, the RSC appears to play a central role in self-modeling
(Metzinger, 2003/2004) and predictive coding formulations of
self-world interactions (Hobson and Friston, 2012, Friston, 2014;
Hobson et al., 2014).
REM-Locked Peak Activity in the Right Retrosplenial
Cortex
Notably, the RSC is an area that shows pronounced REM-
locked activity changes —robust REM-locked activation has been
observed in the right RSC, in contrast to an adjacent area (with
no statistically significant activation) in the left RSC (Hong et al.,
2009) (Figure 4). This finding is remarkable because RSC is
relatively small and the left and the right RSCs border each
other. This finding attests to the capacity of fMRI of video-timed
REMs to localize REM-locked activation (Hong et al., 2009). Our
fMRI study of video-timed REMs (Hong et al., 2009) and Darby
et al. (2017), along with lesion studies that suggest that the right
RSC is involved in topographic orientation or spatial navigation
(Maguire, 2001), speak to the importance of comparing the left
RSC and the right RSC in future studies (see Figure 4).
NEURAL AND PERCEPTUAL
CORRELATES OF REMS DURING
DREAMING SLEEP
It should be noted that functionally segregated responses were
based on the correlates of rapid eye movements (i.e., changes in
brain activation when eye movements occur) during REM sleep
(Hong et al., 2009), not the correlates of the REM sleep episode,
which includes substantial portions without eye movements [73–
86% of REM sleep is devoid of REMs (Arnulf, 2011)]. The time
resolution of fMRI (seconds) is suitable for studying the neural
correlates of eye movements where brain activation associated
with REMs in sleep is characteristically widespread (Hong et al.,
2009) (see Figure 5B).
REM-Locked Binding
Surprisingly, the peaks of the REM-locked activation were clearly
localized not only in the primary visual but also in the primary
non-visual sensory cortex — and regions implicated in perceptual
binding of elemental attributes of visual perception (shape,
movement, and color) and of visual and non-visual perception
to form a unified percept (Figure 5). The neuronal correlates of
FIGURE 4 | Rapid eye movements (REM)-locked activation in retrosplenial
cortex (RSC). (A) Upper panel shows coronal view, lower axial view. Black
lines indicate the mid-sagittal plane. Green crosshair is at the right RSC peak
activity point (Talairach coordinates 4, –46, 12, t = 10.5). Threshold has been
reduced to uncorrected P < 0.5 (t = 0) to illustrate the failure to detect
significant responses in the RSC on the left hemisphere, which contrasts with
the adjacent robust activation in the right hemisphere. (B) Left panel shows a
coronal view and right sagittal view. The black line on the coronal view
indicates the mid-sagittal plane. Green lines pass the right RSC peak activity
point and show location of the other views. Thresholded higher at corrected
P < 0.00005 (t = 10.1). V1, primary visual cortex; CeM, central medial
thalamic nucleus (a part of intralaminar/midline group). Adapted from Hong
et al. (2009) with the permission from Hong.
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FIGURE 5 | Brain regions activated in association with REMs in sleep. Eleven healthy participants participated in the study. Each participant slept two consecutive
nights in the MRI scanner from about 11 pm until they awoke in the morning. We obtained fMRI data as soon as REMs were recognized by video-monitoring, and for
as long as they continued. Twenty four REM sleep scans were obtained from eleven participants. We timed REMs from video recording, then to study the neural
correlates of REMs, we employed a rapid event-related Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) fMRI design, where each REM constituted a natural event.
From the timing of REMs, we predicted the time course of fMRI signal (estimated hemodynamic changes following REMs), then identified the voxels that match this
predicted time course using a general linear model. Then, we performed ‘random effects’ analysis on the results of the 24 individual scans (one sample t-test). We
used SPM2 for these statistical analyses. All images were spatially normalized. (A,B) Thresholded at uncorrected P < 0.001 (T = 3.5, N); an additional spatial extent
threshold of five continguous voxels was applied. (A) Projection onto a surface rendering of a template brain. This shows activation of precentral motor cortex and
postcentral somatosensory cortex time-locked to REMs. (B) Upper row shows median sagittal views, lower row axial views. Green lines show location of the other
views. This shows that REM-locked activation is characteristically widespread. Ci, anterior cingulate gyrus; Cd, head of caudate nucleus; GP, globus pallidus; Ins,
insula; MB, midbrain; MT, middle temporal gyrus; OG, occipital gyrus; paCi, paracingulate gyrus; PFC, medial prefrontal cortex; Pu, putamen; SC, superior colliculus;
ST, superior temporal gyrus; Th, thalamus. See Figure 3 in (Hong et al., 2009) for REM-locked activation (corrected P < 0.05) of non-visual primary sensory cortices
(auditory, vestibular, and olfactory), Wernicke’s and Broca’s area, fusiform gyrus and mesopontine tegmentum. (C,D) To highlight peak REM-locked activations, the
threshold was raised to a high level, corrected P < 0.00005 (T = 10.1, 1). (C) Peaks were clearly localized in striate cortex (the primary visual cortex, V1. White
arrows indicate V1), V2, thalamic reticular nucleus (indicated by green arrows), claustrum (Cls, the posterior-ventral zone, i.e., the putative visual zone), superior
temporal gyrus (STG), bed nucleus of stria terminalis (BST). Green lines on the coronal view inside the box (the number in mm denote distance from the AC) show
locations of the serial axial views (the numbers in mm denote distance from the AC-PC plane). (D) Peaks were clearly localized to the substantia innominata,
bilaterally. These clusters overlap the cholinergic basal nucleus projecting to the posterior neocortex, including visual cortex. Adapted from Hong et al. (2009) with
the permission from Hong.
binding have been studied extensively in wakefulness (Steriade
et al., 1991; Tallon-Baudry and Bertrand, 1999; Engel and Singer,
2001; Logothetis et al., 2001; Niessing et al., 2005) — and in
REM sleep (Llinás and Ribary, 1993), and particularly when
eye movements occur in REM sleep (Gross and Gotman, 1999;
Jouny et al., 2000). These studies and ours (Hong et al., 2009)
support the notion that synchronous gamma oscillations mediate
binding both in wakefulness and dreaming. However, it cannot
be ruled out that such REM-locked gamma oscillations may
have contributions from eye movements (Hipp and Siegel, 2013;
Muthukumaraswamy, 2013; Yuval-Greenberg et al., 2008).
REM-Locked Peak Activation in the
Thalamic Reticular Nucleus and the
Claustrum
Based on neuroanatomy and the macroscopic organization of
neural structures, Crick and Koch proposed the thalamic reticular
nucleus and claustrum as two candidates crucial for binding
information distributed within and across different sensory
and motor modalities in the brain (Crick, 1984; Crick and
Koch, 2005). It was remarkable that robust peak activation
time-locked to REMs were identified within the thalamic
reticular nucleus and claustrum (Figure 5C) (Hong et al.,
2009). In 2017, Koch reported a new digital reconstruction
method that enabled the tracing of three neurons in the
claustrum of a mouse - and these neurons arborize extensively
throughout the cortex across both hemispheres (Reardon, 2017).
Interestingly, a recent DTI study - of a hundred human subjects
- showed that that the claustrum is the most densely connected
area among all the brain regions studied (Torgerson et al.,
2014). The role of the claustrum in binding and salience
detection has also been considered by Remedios et al. (2010)
and Smythies et al. (2012), respectively. Electric stimulation
through an electrode implanted in the claustrum in a female
caused reversible disruption of consciousness; complete arrest of
volitional behavior, unresponsiveness and no recollection of the
event (Koubeissi et al., 2014). In summary, convergent evidence
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suggests that the claustrum plays a crucial role in sensorimotor
integration and generation of consciousness in waking (Crick and
Koch, 2005; Remedios et al., 2010; Smythies et al., 2012; Koubeissi
et al., 2014; Torgerson et al., 2014; Reardon, 2017) and dreaming
(Hong et al., 2009).
Correlates of Waking Visual Perception
and Imagery and Dream Visual Imagery
Shared Neural Machinery for All Visual Experience
Importantly, persons with damage to the posterior left
hemisphere not only lose the capacity to dream, but also
lose capacity to generate waking visual imagery from long-term
visual memory (Farah, 1984). A study of split-brain patients
(whose corpus callosum connecting the two hemispheres of
the brain is surgically severed to treat refractory epilepsy) also
endorses the left posterior localization for the image generation
process (Farah et al., 1985). Greater REM-locked activation in
this region (Hong et al., 2009) (Figure 6A) gives additional
support that machinery is shared for generation of waking and
dreaming visual imagery. Interestingly, the review of PET and
fMRI studies concluded that waking visual perception also shares
the same neural machinery with waking visual imagery (Kosslyn
et al., 2001). In summary, the machinery is shared regardless
of presence (waking visual perception) or absence (waking and
dream visual imagery) of visual signals from outside world.
Scanning Eye Movements Play a Generative Role for
All Visual Experience
In addition to findings suggesting that machinery is shared
for all visual experience, there is evidence for the shared role
of scanning eye movements in the generation of all visual
experience. Studies with split-brain patients suggest that objects
in images are constructed sequentially, one part at a time,
and parts are arranged into a proper configuration in the
left cerebral hemisphere (Kosslyn, 1988). These findings –
revealing the sequential construction of parts to form waking
visual imagery – are consistent with the findings of scanning
eye movements in the generation of waking visual imagery
(Brandt and Stark, 1997; Laeng and Teodorescu, 2002). The
scanpaths (repetitive sequences of fixations and saccades) during
waking visual perception (see Box 2) are highly correlated
with those during waking visual imagery of the same visual
object; suggesting that scanpaths are an integral part of the
visual representation – and are used as a spatial index for the
construction of component parts of an image during image
generation (Brandt and Stark, 1997; Laeng and Teodorescu, 2002;
Hassabis and Maguire, 2009; Mirza et al., 2016). Hebb (1968)
hypothesized that “such an empty gaze, serves the function of
assisting the mental re-construction of a representation” (Laeng
et al., 2014). Here, empty gaze implies saccadic fixation that
cannot garner any visual information. Likewise, in dreaming,
REMs may reenact the scanpath of eye movements in waking
visual perception of the same object or scene and retrieve
the visual information encoded by the scanpath (Hong et al.,
2009).
A synthesis of the findings of others (Farah, 1984; Kosslyn,
1988; Brandt and Stark, 1997; Kosslyn et al., 2001; Laeng and
BOX 2 | Saccadic eye movements
To enable waking visual perception, the eyes move quickly from one fixation
point to the next. These scanning, jerky eye movements are called saccades.
The brain automatically chooses points to scan that have salient or precise
information, e.g., another’s eyes and lips, and sample visual sensory data from
those points. Saccades are necessary for data sampling, because the part of
the retina which provides high-resolution visual sensory data (called fovea) is
very small in human and sees only the central two degrees of the visual field.
The distributed neuronal circuit that controls saccadic eye movements and
subserves visuospatial attention (called the oculomotor circuit) has been
extensively studied in humans and animals (see Leigh and Zee, 2015 for
review). There has been some controversy over whether REMs are saccades.
We demonstrated, with PET (Hong et al., 1995), and functional MRI (fMRI)
(Hong et al., 2009), that REMs are also saccades, which are associated with
activation of the oculomotor circuit, in a time-locked manner (using fMRI that
has superior time resolution). Scanning saccadic eye movements in
wakefulness occur about four times a second, which interestingly is about the
same frequency of bursts of PGO waves and REMs in sleep. This figure shows
a scanpath during free examination of a photograph with both eyes for 1 min.
Adapted from (Yarbus, 1967) with the permission from Springer United States.
Teodorescu, 2002; Friston et al., 2012) and our own work (Hong
et al., 2009) suggests that neuronal machinery is shared for
waking visual perception, waking visual imagery and dream
visual imagery. It further suggests that scanning eye movements
play a role in the generation of images in all of these contexts.
This perspective of the generic image-generating role of scanning
eye movement fits nicely with the ’active inference’ (Brown
et al., 2013) and predictive coding theory (Figure 3). From
this perspective, our findings of REM-locked activation in the
supplementary eye field (SEF) in the left hemisphere (Hong
et al., 2009) (Figure 6B) can be taken not only as evidence that
REMs scan dream visual imagery but also as evidence that REMs
generate dream visual imagery. The left SEF has a predominant
role in sequencing saccadic eye movements in waking visual
perception (Gaymard et al., 1993; Grosbras et al., 1999, 2001).
Single Unit Study of the Neural
Correlates of REMs
Andrillon et al. (2015) measured single-neuron activity and
intracranial electroencephalography (EEG) time-locked to REMs
in neurosurgical epilepsy patients. This study demonstrated that
REMs in sleep are associated with hierarchical processing of
visual information (Andrillon et al., 2015). Electrode locations
were chosen exclusively for clinical purposes but included key
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FIGURE 6 | Hemispheric differences in REM-locked activation. Voxels with greater REM-locked activity compared to its homolog in the other hemisphere are shown.
All images are thresholded at uncorrected P < 0.001 (T = 3.5) and additionally at a spatial extent of >5 contiguous voxels. (A) Orthogonally oriented statistical
parametric maps (maximum intensity projections). REM-locked activation was greater in the posterior left hemisphere. (B) Cross at the greatest hemispheric
difference, supplementary eye field (SEF) (left greater than right). The left supplementary eye field has a clearly predominant role in sequencing saccade programming
during visual scanning in wakefulness. Adapted from Hong et al. (2009) with the permission from Hong.
regions in visual processing; namely, hippocampus, entorhinal
cortex and parahippocampal gyrus. These are MTL structures
belonging to the ventral visual pathway, also known as the ‘what
pathway’ and are known to be associated with visual-mnemonic
processing. Researchers measured changes time-locked to REMs
in sleep and, for comparison, visual and non-visual REMs
in wakefulness and visual presentation of famous people and
landmarks during fixation without eye movements. They found
that “Individual neurons, especially in the MTL, exhibit reduced
firing rates before REMs as well as transient increases in firing
rate immediately after, similar to activity patterns observed upon
image presentation during fixation without eye movements.
Moreover, the selectivity of individual units is correlated with
their response latency, such that units activated after a small
number of images or REMs exhibit delayed increases in firing
rates.”
Single unit (neuron) recording or deep event-related potential
can directly measure 10 ms difference in latency unlike fMRI,
but has limited regional coverage. fMRI has limited time-
resolution (seconds), but it can perform simultaneous regional
measurement in the whole brain. Thus, our fMRI study of video-
timed REMs could guide selection of electrode locations for
future single-neuron recording studies of the neural correlates
of REMs. Thalamic reticular nucleus, claustrum, cholinergic
basal nucleus, and primary visual cortex (Figure 5C) and RSC
(Figure 4B) are promising locations to study. The strategy of
identifying study location with fMRI before single unit recording
worked well to elucidate face recognition (Chang and Tsao, 2017).
REM-Locked Visual and Hierarchical
Processing
Considering findings that used complementary methods (Hong
et al., 2009; Andrillon et al., 2015), we conclude that information
processing time-locked to REMs is visual and hierarchical
(Hobson et al., 2014). Our fMRI findings clearly showed
REM-locked processing of visual information. We found the
most robust REM-locked activation localized to the primary
visual cortex, the ‘visual thalamic reticular nucleus’ and the
‘visual claustrum’ (Figure 5C) (Hong et al., 2009). REM-
locked multisensory integration (Hong et al., 2009) suggests
that REM-locked processing is hierarchical (Hobson et al.,
2014). Obviously, prior to multisensory integration, each sensory
modality should be processed first in its respective primary
sensory cortex. In other words, the output of the primary sensory
cortex acts as an input to higher hierarchical level that binds
multisensory information. REM-locked activation of Broca’s and
Wernicke’s language areas (Hong et al., 2009), which belongs to
a higher hierarchical level than the primary sensory cortex, also
suggests that REM-locked information processing is hierarchical
(Hobson et al., 2014). Our findings (Hong et al., 2009) speak
to REM-locked hierarchical processing, which is an essential
component of the predictive coding hypothesis (although direct
evidence for REM-locked prediction or prediction error signals,
another essential component of predictive coding, is still lacking).
Controversy About the Scanning
Hypothesis
A broad body of data supports the idea that REMs scan dream
imagery, but controversy about the implicit scanning hypothesis
remains. See (Arnulf, 2011) for review. Several authors have
discussed the limitations of studies relying on retrospective verbal
reports (Leclair-Visonneau et al., 2010). A further limitation of
verbal reports – which may explain inconsistent results - follows
from the fact that visual targets are mostly selected automatically
(i.e., without conscious attention) during visual scanning in
wakefulness and probably in dreaming. This means subjects
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may only report consciously selected, qualitative content (Hong
et al., 1997, 2009). However, studying persons with REM sleep
behavior disorders may circumvent the limitations of studies
relying purely on dream reports. Persons with this disorder enact
dreams due to a failure to suppress muscle tone during REM
sleep. Thus, directional correspondence of REMs with head and
limbs during goal-oriented behavior can be observed directly.
Indeed, studies of this sort suggest that “when present, REMs
imitate the scanning of the dream scene” (Leclair-Visonneau
et al., 2010).
Evidence against the scanning hypothesis (Arnulf, 2011) can
be summarized as follows: (1) REMs may be unaccompanied
by visual imagery in some cases of dreaming (e.g., in fetuses,
neonates, congenitally blind, cats without visual cortex) and
vice versa; visual imagery in dreaming may not always be
accompanied by REMs (e.g., non-REM sleep, tonic REM sleep).
The congenitally blind can report landscapes, objects and human
figures in their dreams and are able to draw them. Furthermore,
those dream content reports correlate with the decrease in alpha
strength recorded from occipital regions (Bértolo et al., 2003).
This suggests visual imagery in dreaming of the congenitally
blind, because alpha activity attenuation is regarded as an
indicator of visual imagery in general (Lopes da Silva, 2003).
Furthermore, REM-locked activation in visual brain areas in
utero suggests a REM-locked primitive form of vision (Schöpf
et al., 2014). (2) In monkeys many binocular REMs are not
conjugated (Zhou and King, 1997). This finding appears to be a
potential argument against the scanning hypothesis, but it may
indicate that binocular coordination is often disrupted during
sleep – in much the same way as it is disrupted in wakefulness
in cases of strabismus.
Dreaming in Sleep Without REMs
Rapid eye movement sleep has often been equated with dreaming
sleep, but visual dreams occur when REMs are not observed;
i.e., in tonic REM sleep (Foulkes and Pope, 1973; Hodoba et al.,
2008) and in non-REM sleep (Fosse et al., 2001; Siclari et al.,
2013).
Our basic premise is that REMs offer a unique probe into
consciousness (as opposed to representing an epiphenomenon).
This argument rests upon the notion of active vision that
has become essentially internalized during sleep (Hobson and
Friston, 2014). The neurophysiological and anatomical evidence
upon which this argument rests has been reviewed in detail
in (Hobson and Friston, 2012). This evidence rests largely
on the remarkable homology between PGO waves in REM
sleep (Nelson et al., 1983) and the neurophysiological responses
that accompany oculomotor reflexes during saccadic searches
of a visual scene in active (visual) inference (Purpura et al.,
2003). Clearly, associating REMs with qualitative experience
during perceptual synthesis in REM sleep does not necessarily
imply a one-to-one relationship between REM and dreaming.
For example, neuromodulatory changes (Hobson, 2009) that
disengage the oculomotor (pontine) correlates of internalized
visual searches could, in principle, permit deep hierarchical
inference in the absence of PGO waves and overt REMs. We
mean this in the same sense that attention can, on some views,
be seen as covert eye movements that are not accompanied by
activation of the superior colliculus and pontine nuclei (Rizzolatti
et al., 1987; Bernier et al., 2017). In other words, there is
a possibility that qualitative visual experience could arise in
non-REM sleep; in the same sense that we can deploy visual
attention without actually moving our eyes. This speaks to the
debate about the prevalence of dreaming during REM and non-
REM sleep – see Arnulf (2011) for discussion on this central
issue.
The potential dissociation between REM and dreaming also
speaks to an interesting issue (raised by our reviewers) about
scene construction from the first and second person perspectives
(Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Mirza et al., 2016). The crucial
role of projective geometry in generative models of perspective
taking has recently been acknowledged – and linked explicitly
to active inference and predictive coding (Rudrauf et al., 2017).
Second person perspectives are quintessentially counterfactual
and would therefore not necessarily entail oculomotor responses.
This counterfactual aspect is an inherent part of active inference
during scene construction; namely, inferring “what would I see
if I looked over there” (Mirza et al., 2016). This computational
aspect of (counterfactual) predictive coding further suggests
that REM indexes a particular aspect of dream phenomenology;
namely, rehearsing an active visual engagement with the world –
from a first-person perspective. It is this particular aspect of active
perceptual synthesis that we propose underwrites the unique
relationship between a particular sort of qualitative perceptual
(conscious) experience and REMs.
The issues and controversies surrounding the neural correlates
of non-REM dreaming have been discussed previously (Nielsen,
2000). These correlates are notoriously difficult to study because
non-REM sleep lacks an easily detectable event for correlation
(c.f., REMs in REM sleep). However, one would predict that
non-REM sleep dreaming shares neural machinery with REM
dreaming, for example, Nielsen (2000) proposed that “covert”
REM sleep processing — during non-REM sleep — generates
non-REM sleep mentation. Alternatively, Siclari et al. (2017) have
reported that dream experience correlates with high density EEG
measures of ‘activation’ in posterior cortical regions, whether
the subjects are awakened from REM sleep or from non-REM
sleep, whether they could recall the content of dream experience
or not. Furthermore, seeing faces, places or movement in REM
sleep dreams was associated with increased high-frequency
EEG activity in specific cortical areas, which corresponded to
those engaged with visual processing of the same contents in
wakefulness (Siclari et al., 2017). Likewise, a machine-learning
decoder — trained on human fMRI responses to natural images
(e.g., male, car, and street) in wakefulness — suggests that the
same neuronal representations are engaged to experience the
same images in dreaming; during sleep-onset non-REM sleep
(Horikawa et al., 2013).
In summary, EEG studies of the neural correlates of dreaming
(Siclari et al., 2017) and fMRI studies of the neural correlates of
REMs (Hong et al., 2009) speak to a common neural architecture
for visual experience across REM sleep, non-REM sleep and
wakefulness, but there are many unknowns in this area that need
to be explored.
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Neural Correlates of REMs (Studied With
fMRI) vs. Dreaming (Studied With EEG)
It seems safe to say that REMs are coupled with dreaming
consciousness and particularly visual perception in dreaming,
because fMRI evidence for REM-locked visual information
processing and multisensory and sensorimotor integration
is robust. This sort of integration is essential for waking
consciousness and probably for dreaming consciousness as well
(Metzinger, 2003, pp. 254, 258), and there are correlations
between REMs and visual experience in dreaming that can be
seen at the within-subject level (Hong et al., 1997). However, the
neural correlates of REMs studied with fMRI (Hong et al., 2009)
do differ from the neural correlates of dreaming studied with
high-density EEG (Siclari et al., 2017). These differences may be
explained by the measurements of brain activity: EEG has greater
temporal resolution, while fMRI has superior spatial resolution;
EEG electrodes are more sensitive to neuronal signals from
the surface of the brain, in relation to deeper subcortical brain
structures. There are also differences in independent variables;
i.e., motor behavior versus the subjective dream experience:
unlike dream experiences, REMs are temporally precise with
a brief duration and well-defined onset and termination, thus
enabling study of time-locked changes. Unlike REMs, dream
experiences are more ambiguous and have varied content: Should
a brief thought-like mentation be called a dream? Is its neural
correlate the same as the neural correlate of a dream experience
with a narrative? In principle, the time series of REMs should
afford greater statistical power in the search for the neural
correlates of dreaming, in relation to simply comparing neuronal
responses in the presence or absence of dream experience.
An interesting issue in this setting is that not all awakenings
from phasic REM sleep with REM bursts produce a dream report
(Siclari et al., 2013). One explanation may be that conscious
experience is a graded phenomenon (Metzinger, 2003, pp. 135,
604, 620); rather than simply absent vs. present – and not
all dream experiences that are time-locked to REMs become
conscious. Alternatively, dream experience simply could not be
remembered, thus not reported (suggested by our reviewer).
To fully address these issues further studies are needed;
including high-density EEG studies of neural correlates of REMs
(possibly with reanalysis of collected data) and fMRI/MEG
studies of the neural correlates of dreaming.
REMs — NATURAL TASK-FREE PROBE
IDEAL FOR NEURODEVELOPMENTAL
STUDIES
Visual perception — which may appear to be a passive process —
is, on the active inference view, an active process of inferring the
world that involves moving the eyes rapidly (about four times
a second) to salient targets. We proposed that REMs index the
task of generating and scanning the model of the world through
multisensory integration in dreaming (Hobson et al., 2014). In
other word, REMs co-occur with these important brain events
which are essential for perception, both in dreaming and in
wakefulness. Event-related fMRI (the events being video-timed
REMs) takes snapshots of these fundamental mind/brain events.
Since REMs are natural, task-free probes, the study of REMs
with fMRI can be used in many different subjects, including
infants, persons with dementia, and animals, who cannot tolerate
conventional brain activation paradigms (Hong and Harris, 2009;
Hong et al., 2009). Furthermore, it is feasible to time REMs of the
human fetus by calculating lens center and eye center on serial
fMRI images. This means one can study REM-locked fetal brain
activity using fMRI (Schöpf et al., 2014). Available fetal brain
imaging (Ferrazzi et al., 2014; Dunn et al., 2015; Jakab et al., 2015;
van den Heuvel and Thomason, 2016) also includes MEG. In
short, longitudinal studies from before birth are, in principle, now
possible.
Rapid eye movements occur in mammals and birds (Hobson,
2009) and Australian dragons (Shein-Idelson et al., 2016),
thus REM-locked changes can be studied in other species
than humans. For example, the sleeping dragon study showed
robust correlation of these video-timed REMs with intracranial
electrophysiological (including single cell) recordings (Shein-
Idelson et al., 2016). Additionally, this study also showed that
video recording of closed eyes can be rendered to computerized
analysis to time and quantify REMs automatically.
In summary, REMs offer a promising probe to study
phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of the basic
mind/brain function, especially visual perception.
Why Are Infants Ideal for Studying
REMs?
Crucially, infants are ideal subjects for REM sleep studies
because they sleep for several hours during the daytime; REM
sleep is usually their initial sleep state; and up to half of
their sleep (more than half in premature infants) is REM
sleep (Hong and Harris, 2009). Furthermore, using REMs as a
task-free probe that is not confounded by differences in task
difficulty and subject performance — issues that often confound
developmental studies — enables the matched comparison of
findings from infants with adults throughout the entire life span.
It is straightforward to study REMs in sleep in infants. Compared
to studying REMs in adults, it is easier and less expensive to study
REMs in neonates.
On a practical note, our previous neonate studies have
demonstrated feasibility and safety. Notably, 2 h during daytime
sufficed for collection of data from a neonate, whereas we
reserved 16 h over two nights for an adult. One of the
two neonates studied had sufficient REM sleep for analysis
(the video recording of REMs of this neonate can be found
in Supplementary Video S1). Event-related analysis revealed
fMRI signal increases in the thalamus and signal decreases
in the visual cortex time-locked to REMs. These findings are
consistent with previous fMRI studies on sleeping (Born et al.,
1998; Redcay et al., 2007) or sedated (Yamada et al., 1997,
2000) children, which show that photic stimulation through
children’s closed eyelids induced a signal decrease in the visual
cortex. Because REM sleep latency is 3–4 h for the age
group 4 1/2 – 7 (Roffwarg et al., 1966), so two consecutive
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nights study may be required for this age group, as for
adults.
Why Should REMs Be Timed From
Video-Recording Instead of EOG?
Electroculogram is the most commonly used method for
monitoring eye movements. However, because rapidly
changing magnetic fields during MRI confound the EOG
signal, video-recording detects approximately four times as
many REMs in fMRI studies compared to EOG recording
(Hong et al., 2009). EOG measures electric currents induced
by movements of the electrically charged eyeball, whereas
video-monitoring directly measures eye movements (see
Supplementary Video S2 for a video-recording of REMs during
fMRI).
Video-Timing Findings Lend Support to
Predictive Coding
Crucially, fMRI correlates of REMs timed with EOG (Wehrle
et al., 2005; Miyauchi et al., 2009) are similar to those with video-
timing. However, it is our new findings in the video-timed study
(Hong et al., 2009) that are construed as empirical support for
predictive coding (Hobson et al., 2014). First, fMRI findings of
video-timed REMs (Hong et al., 2009) endorse the premise that
REMs generate and scan dream visual imagery, as mandated
by ‘active inference’ under predictive coding (Hobson et al.,
2014).
Second, video-timing REMs identify REM-locked activation
of the subpallidal basal forebrain (Figure 5D), the major
source of cholinergic input to the cortex (Hong et al.,
2009). From the perspective of predictive coding, cholinergic
modulation may play an important role in modulating and
gating prediction error signals (Hobson et al., 2014). REM-
locked cholinergic boosting of superficial pyramidal cells in
the cortex is potentially important from the perspective of
predictive coding, as superficial pyramidal cells (layers II and
III) are thought to encode prediction error (Hobson et al.,
2014).
Third, video-timed REMs showed that REM-locked
activation occurs in the claustrum and thalamic reticular
nucleus (Figure 5C) and the precentral motor and postcentral
somatosensory cortex (Figure 5A) and the right RSC (Figure 4)
(Hong et al., 2009). These fMRI findings are consistent with
the idea that perception and action are intimately related
(Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2013; Clark,
2013). Converging evidence suggests that RSC may play a
role in scene construction and spatial navigation (Hassabis
and Maguire, 2007). Spatial navigation requires sensory-
motor integration. REM-locked activation in the sensorimotor
cortex is in line with intracranial EEG findings in human
subjects (De Carli et al., 2016) and with fMRI findings in lucid
dreamers (Dresler et al., 2011). REM-locked activation in the
precentral motor - and postcentral sensory cortex - speaks to an
intimate perception-action coupling in general as well as visual
perception-oculomotor integration in particular. The thalamic
reticular nucleus and claustrum are crucial for sensory-motor
binding (Crick, 1984; Crick and Koch, 2005). In summary, fMRI
correlates of video-timed REMs are consistent with the proposal
that the brain is organized so as to facilitate sensory-motor
binding (Engel and Singer, 2001) and scene construction during
eye movements in both sleep and wakefulness. Thus, fMRI
studies of video-timed REMs (as opposed to fMRI study of
EOG-timed REMs) may offer a powerful tool to examine the
functional brain architectures that underwrite active inference in
wakefulness – and sleep.
ACTIVE INFERENCE AND
PROTOCONSCIOUSNESS HYPOTHESIS
Rapid eye movement sleep is most abundant during fetal
development and infancy, then decreases gradually, but persists
throughout life (Figure 1). This time course suggests that it
serves an indispensable role, not only in the development of
perceptual capacity (Marks et al., 1995; Schöpf et al., 2014), but
also in maintaining it (Hobson, 2009). To articulate this from the
perspective of predictive coding, “dreaming plays an essential role
in maintaining and enhancing the capacity to model the world
by minimizing model complexity and thereby maximizing both
statistical and thermodynamic efficiency (Hobson et al., 2014)”.
In brief, perception entails perceptual inference and
hypothesis testing. This means that it is necessary to distil
general trends when fitting a model to noisy data – like the
sensory data sampled from the world (Hobson et al., 2014).
The resulting parsimony principle – of choosing the simplest
explanation that provides an accurate account of the data at
hand – is necessary; not only for scientific hypotheses but also
perceptual hypotheses (Hobson and Friston, 2012; Hobson
et al., 2014). Attending to every detail leads to a failure to
generalize and make useful predictions about new data. In
statistical inference and machine learning this problem is known
as ‘overfitting’ (Hobson and Friston, 2012), which may provide
a metaphor for the psychopathology of autism (Pellicano and
Burr, 2012; Lawson et al., 2014; Van de Cruys et al., 2014) that we
will return to later.
In this setting, REM sleep may be necessary to minimize
the complexity of the brain’s ‘generative models’ (Hobson et al.,
2014). The brain is sequestered from the world in REM sleep
because of sensory input gating (Hobson et al., 2000). In REM
sleep there are almost no externally derived sensory data for
which an accurate explanation is required (Hobson et al., 2014).
Thus, in REM sleep the brain “can ignore the accuracy part
of model evidence” and “can focus on minimizing (model)
complexity, using exactly the same hierarchical prediction
error minimization that it uses during wakefulness” (Hobson
et al., 2014). This provides a formal and unified account
of dreaming and waking perception, using exactly the same
neuronal processes.
Inferring the causes of sensory signals requires complex brain
structures that embody a (generative) model of how sensations
are generated. Computing an explanation for the sensorium
entails an enormous amount of energetic work, that is, substantial
energy consumption by the brain. Happily, minimizing model
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complexity (statistical efficiency) guarantees efficient energy
consumption (Hobson et al., 2014). Although the brain strives
for statistical and thermodynamic efficiency, it still consumes
a substantial amount of energy: representing only about 2% of
our body weight, our brain consumes about 20% of the body’s
energy supplies. Mammals and birds that evince REM sleep can
infer social stimuli which are “inherently more complex and
ambiguous than non-social stimuli” (Pellicano and Burr, 2012).
The imperative to reduce complexity during sleep may therefore
be greater for the complicated brains of mammals and birds
(Hobson and Friston, 2012; Hobson et al., 2014).
Protoconsciousness theory posits that sensorimotor
integration is developed off-line in utero for a better chance
of survival in outside world; for example, we practice walking
during REM sleep in utero, before we actually learn to walk
after birth (Hobson, 2017). This hypothesis is clearly difficult
to prove, but is in line with the enhancement of procedural
learning and memory associated with sleep in adults (Stickgold,
2005; Hobson, 2017). Procedural memory is used in automatic
execution of the integrated procedures, like walking, swimming,
driving a car or playing basketball, which are acquired only
after repetitive training. Notably, sensorimotor integration
time-locked to REMs in sleep was the key finding of our fMRI
studies (Hong et al., 2009). Furthermore, robust REM-locked
activation of RSC (Figure 4), the key structure engaged by
spatial navigation (Maguire, 2001; Harker and Whishaw,
2004; Vann et al., 2009), supports Hobson’s proposal of
off-line practice of walking (navigation) during REM sleep
in utero. Additionally, it is in line with the hypothesis that
when developing infants attain locomotive capacity REM
sleep diminishes (Roffwarg et al., 1966). In summary, there
is much evidence to suggest that virtual reality models and
generative models in predictive coding are formally equivalent
(Hobson and Friston, 2012, Friston, 2014; Hobson et al.,
2014).
PREDICTIVE CODING ACCOUNTS OF
SEVERE MENTAL DISORDERS
Predictive coding theory explains what might happen if inference
goes awry. Predictive coding offers a coherent explanation for
waking perception as perceptual inference — and explains the
experiences of persons with autism (Pellicano and Burr, 2012;
Friston et al., 2013, 2014; Gómez et al., 2014; Lawson et al.,
2014; Quattrocki and Friston, 2014; Skewes et al., 2014; Van de
Cruys et al., 2014) and schizophrenia in terms of false inference
(Dima et al., 2009; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Brown et al.,
2013; Friston et al., 2014). In what follows, we briefly consider
predictive coding in schizophrenia (autism) and how it relates to
REMs.
Schizophrenia
In predictive coding, ‘precision’ controls the relative
influence of bottom-up prediction errors and top-down
predictions at different levels in hierarchical schemes.
Statistically, ‘precision’ means the inverse of the variance
or degree of uncertainty. This means that prediction errors
that are afforded more precision have a greater impact
on belief updating (Friston, 2010). ‘Precision’ is thought
to be encoded by the postsynaptic gain of superficial
(layers II–III) pyramidal cells encoding ‘prediction error’
(Adams et al., 2013; Friston et al., 2014). “This gain
corresponds exactly to the synaptic efficacy that underlies
the adaptive changes in connection strengths” (Friston et al.,
2013).
Aberrant neuromodulatory ‘precision’ control in
predictive coding is consistent with nearly every synaptic
or physiological theory of schizophrenia, including a
dysfunction of dopaminergic and NMDA receptors, GABAergic
abnormalities, and dysfunctional excitation-inhibition
balance (Friston et al., 2014). Subtle changes in the delicate
balance of ‘precision’ ascribed to top-down prior beliefs
and bottom-up sensory evidence can have a profound
effect on inference, resulting in false beliefs (Adams et al.,
2013; Friston et al., 2014), which may account both for
hallucinations and delusions in schizophrenia (Fletcher and
Frith, 2009). “Believing and perceiving, although conceptually
distinct, emerge as deeply mechanically intertwined” (Clark,
2013).
Core defects in predictive coding have been used to
explain or simulate not only familiar psychotic symptoms
like hallucinations, catatonia, delusions, and misattribution of
agency (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Adams et al., 2013; Friston
et al., 2014), but also an array of laboratory findings in
schizophrenia; such as abnormal smooth pursuit eye movements,
reduced responses to oddball stimuli interspersed with repetitive
stimuli (i.e., a failure to adequately predict sensory input
renders everything surprising), a deficit in sensory attenuation
during self-generated activity (Adams et al., 2013; Friston
et al., 2014) and resistance to illusion (illusions occur when
prior predictions override veridical sensory evidence, as in
the hollow-mask illusion). Dima et al. (2009) suggested a
weakening of top-down prediction and strengthening of bottom-
up sensory evidence in schizophrenia during presentation of
hollow faces.
Efference copy (or corollary discharge) is an internal
copy (or transformation) of a motor signal that predicts
the sensory consequences of movement and “tag[s] these
stimuli as self-generated (Fletcher and Frith, 2009)” (see
Box 1). Failure to attenuate the sensory consequences of
action or speech in patients with schizophrenia may lead to
“misattribution of self-generated actions [and speech] to others,”
and delusions of being controlled and auditory hallucinations,
respectively (Fletcher and Frith, 2009). A recent fMRI study
suggested reduced sensory attenuation in individuals with
schizophrenia, especially those with high hallucination scores
(Shergill et al., 2014). Failed sensory attenuation also explains
why individuals with schizophrenia with auditory hallucinations
and passivity experience are more likely to be able to tickle
themselves (Blakemore et al., 2000). Interestingly, it was
reported that healthy individuals are more likely to self-tickle
after awakening from a REM sleep dream (Blagrove et al.,
2006).
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Autism
Predictive coding theory also provides an explanation for the
broad range of phenomena in autism (Pellicano and Burr,
2012; Adams et al., 2013; Friston et al., 2014; Gómez et al.,
2014; Lawson et al., 2014; Skewes et al., 2014; Van de Cruys
et al., 2014), in particular in terms of an imbalance of
precision toward sensory evidence (confidence placed in sensory
evidence), relative to prior beliefs (Friston et al., 2014; Lawson
et al., 2014). Aberrant precision has been used to explain
various aspects of autism (Friston et al., 2014; Lawson et al.,
2014); namely, reduced capacity for generalization (analogous
to ‘overfitting’ in inferential statistics or to reduced ‘signal-
to-noise ratio’), “extreme sensitivity to fluorescent lighting or
to sound of the school bell, exceptional performance on the
embedded figures test and finding hidden figures, an excellent
eye for detail” and reduced susceptibility to visual illusion
(Pellicano and Burr, 2012). Furthermore, the intense desire for
sameness and repetitive behavior in autism may be a means of
reducing the uncertainty in the environment (Pellicano and Burr,
2012).
Active inference and predictive coding formulations have
been extended from exteroceptive sensations – like vision
and audition – to interoceptive sensations from within the
body (Seth, 2013; Quattrocki and Friston, 2014). In infants
with autism, aberrant interoceptive inference may cause “a
failure to contextualize interoceptive cues, elicited by maternal
interactions,” a failure to engage with prosocial cues, and defective
inference about others (Friston et al., 2014). Predictive coding
theory may therefore provide a parsimonious explanation for
social deficits in autism (Friston et al., 2014) as well as non-
social symptoms and perceptual atypical behaviors (Pellicano
and Burr, 2012). Autistic social withdrawal may be a means
to avoid irreducible uncertainty about the environment and
other people’s actions. In addition, many studies indicate
impairment in multisensory integration in autism (Foss-feig
et al., 2010; Russo et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2012). Crucially,
our fMRI study of video-timed REMs was able to provide
extraordinarily robust indication of REM-locked multisensory
integration (and probably REM-locked generation of the model
of the world via predictive coding). We conclude that fMRI
study of video-timed REMs is a promising tool to study autism
throughout development over the entire life span, starting from
birth.
REMs in Schizophrenia and Autism
What would one predict in terms of REMs in schizophrenia
and autism? This is an interesting question from several
perspectives. There is a substantial body of evidence that
suggests people with schizophrenia and autism have difficulties
modulating the precision of sensory signals (Friston, 2017)
and in particular, their attenuation during movement (Shergill
et al., 2005; Oestreich et al., 2015). One obvious prediction
is that REM should be more prevalent due to a failure of
sensory attenuation (and possible compensatory changes higher
in the oculomotor hierarchy). To a certain extent, this is
consistent with more exuberant REMs and REM sleep in
schizotypy (Kuula et al., 2018) and autism, where comorbidity
is associated with increased REM sleep pressure (Baglioni
et al., 2016). The relationship between REM and schizophrenia
is particularly interesting given that abnormalities of eye
movements (particularly, slow pursuit) are one of the most
robust soft neurological signs associated with schizophrenia.
In predictive coding or active inference formulations, these
signs implicate abnormal neuromodulation or precision control
in the visual (and oculomotor) hierarchy (Adams et al.,
2012).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
To recap, we have established a formal link between dream
imagery, REM and the hierarchical, computational anatomy of
cortical and subcortical systems in the brain, with a special
focus on the PGO system. Much of the phenomenology
of interest rests upon the gating or precision control of
ascending prediction errors and descending predictions during
wakefulness and dreaming. It is this connection between the
phenomenology of perceptual synthesis and the physiology
of neuromodulation that, in principle, motivates a link
between conscious processing and the coordination of message
passing in terms of neuromodulatory and attentional selection.
This link speaks to a fundamental role for attention and
mental action in perceptual inference; both in dreaming and
wakefulness.
Our main assertion is that REMs provide a well-defined
empirical entree into the neurophysiological mediation of
qualitative experience. In this sense, there is a potential to use
REM studies to ask whether disorders of consciousness and
perceptual inference can be understood within this extended
framework. We considered some important new leads that
suggest aberrant precision in predictive coding can indeed
be used to understand some key psychiatric disorders. REM-
locked multisensory integration — as demonstrated by our
fMRI studies — indicates REM-locked updating of the brain’s
model of the world (and dreamer’s body at its center) through
multisensory integration. The implicit multisensory binding is
an integral part of multi-level hierarchical predictive coding.
REMs in dreaming sleep can therefore be employed as a
marker of this important mind/brain event. Studying the neural
correlates of REMs may lead to a better understanding of the
mind/brain and its aberrant function in people with autism and
schizophrenia.
Magnetoencephalography (MEG) is a promising tool to study
regional activity changes time-locked to REMs in sleep (Gott
et al., 2017), in particular, multisensory-motor integration as well
as PGO waves (Ioannides et al., 2004). MEG has good spatial
resolution (millimeters precision) and a very high temporal
resolution (milliseconds precision). MEG could show activity
changes before and after REM onset in structures small in size
(Ioannides et al., 2004). Furthermore, non-invasive brain imaging
studies are well placed to identify brain structures for single unit
studies. Finally, employing REMs as a probe may be particularly
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prescient in studies of neurodevelopment and psychopathology,
enabling quantitative, non-invasive and neurophysiologically
grounded studies of autism and schizophrenia - that are
considered to be neurodevelopmental disorders. Longitudinal
fMRI study of video-timed REMs from birth may shed light
on fundamental questions about why our brain has developed
consciousness and implicit self-modeling.
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